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tended rather to create a partnership or at least a conspiracy between the parties, and applied the generally accepted rule that in such a case one partner cannot have an accounting from his co-partner of the proceeds of an illegal transaction; citing Central Trust & Safe Deposit v. Respass, — Ky. —, 66 S. W. 421, 56 L. R. A. 479, I MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW, 147.

PUBLIC OFFICERS—TAXATION—SALARIES OF JUDGES.—The constitution of North Carolina provides that the salaries of the judges shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. The tax commission directed the collection of a tax on such salaries, and the members of the supreme court being of the opinion that their salaries were not subject to taxation on account of the above provision, the court requested the opinion of the attorney general on this question for their guidance. By reason of the interest of the judges in the matter, it was resolved that the court would consider the opinion of the attorney general as settling the matter to the same extent as if it were the decision of the court. By the opinion so filed, Held, that under a constitutional provision that the salaries of the judges shall not be diminished during their continuance in office, the salaries of the chief justice and the associate justices are exempt from taxation, direct or otherwise. In re Taxation of Salaries of Judges (1902), — N. C. —, 42 S. E. Rep. 970.

The decision of the above case seems to be based more on the doctrine that the unrestrained right to tax involves the power to destroy, and would thus place one department of the government at the mercy of another, than that taxation would simply be a prohibited diminution. However, from either view, the result reached is in accordance with previous decisions: Letter by Chief Justice Taney to Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, February 16, 1863; City of New Orleans v, Lea, 14 La. Ann., 197, (1859); Opinion of Attorney General Batchelor, Appendix, 48 N. C. (1856); Comm. v. Mann, 5 Watts & S. 403 (1843); approved 1 Kent's Comm. 294. The only case which upholds the power to tax under a constitutional prohibition of diminution of salary is Commissioners v. Chapman, 2 Rawle, 73 (Penn. 1829), which has since been overruled by the case above cited. In this case the position taken is that such a tax does not diminish salaries; that the provision is intended to shield the incumbent of an office from legislative reduction of the consideration upon which the officer accepted his office. An attempt is also made to distinguish between laws which have a reduction for their object and not for their consequence, applying the prohibition in question to those of the first class. As the cases now stand, however desirable a tax on the salaries of judges may be, under constitutional provisions similar to those in the principal case, such a tax could not be imposed.

RAILROADS—ABOLITION OF GRADE CROSSING—TEMPORARY USE OF STREETS—DAMAGE TO ABUTTING OWNER.—Defendant was required by law to elevate its tracks in the city of Bridgeport so as to abolish grade crossings. The act provided that defendant should "have the free use of such streets or portions of streets and the right to temporarily close such streets as may be necessary for the convenient prosecution of the work." Plaintiff owned a lot fronting on the street adjacent to, and running parallel with the railroad tracks of defendant. On this lot were a grocery store, several tenements, and a livery stable. To facilitate the work of track elevation, defendant temporarily closed this street, and laid two tracks for use during the time required to make the improvements. These tracks were on that half of the street of which the plaintiff owned the fee and left only a six-foot walk in front of plaintiff's property, so that access by roadway was cut off. The street was thus closed and obstructed for over a year, and plaintiff sues for resulting